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Abstract: With technological advancement, implanted medical devices can treat a wide range of
chronic diseases such as cardiac arrhythmia, deafness, diabetes, etc. Cardiac pacemakers are used to
maintain normal heart rhythms. The next generation of these pacemakers is expected to be completely
wireless, providing new security threats. Thus, it is critical to secure pacemaker transmissions between
legitimate nodes from a third party or an eavesdropper. This work estimates the eavesdropping risk
and explores the potential of securing transmissions between leadless capsules inside the heart and
the subcutaneous implant under the skin against external eavesdroppers by using physical-layer
security methods. In this work, we perform phantom experiments to replicate the dielectric properties
of the human heart, blood, and fat for channel modeling between in-body-to-in-body devices and
from in-body-to-off-body scenario. These scenarios reflect the channel between legitimate nodes
and that between a legitimate node and an eavesdropper. In our case, a legitimate node is a leadless
cardiac pacemaker implanted in the right ventricle of a human heart transmitting to a legitimate
receiver, which is a subcutaneous implant beneath the collar bone under the skin. In addition,
a third party outside the body is trying to eavesdrop the communication. The measurements are
performed for ultrawide band (UWB) and industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) frequency bands.
By using these channel models, we analyzed the risk of using the concept of outage probability and
determine the eavesdropping range in the case of using UWB and ISM frequency bands. Furthermore,
the probability of positive secrecy capacity is also determined, along with outage probability of a
secrecy rate, which are the fundamental parameters in depicting the physical-layer security methods.
Here, we show that path loss follows a log-normal distribution. In addition, for the ISM frequency
band, the probability of successful eavesdropping for a data rate of 600 kbps (Electromyogram (EMG))
is about 97.68% at an eavesdropper distance of 1.3 m and approaches 28.13% at an eavesdropper
distance of 4.2 m, whereas for UWB frequency band the eavesdropping risk approaches 0.2847% at
an eavesdropper distance of 0.22 m. Furthermore, the probability of positive secrecy capacity is about
44.88% at eavesdropper distance of 0.12 m and approaches approximately 97% at an eavesdropper
distance of 0.4 m for ISM frequency band, whereas for UWB, the same statistics are 96.84% at 0.12 m
and 100% at 0.4 m. Moreover, the outage probability of secrecy capacity is also determined by using
a fixed secrecy rate.
Keywords: implanted medical devices; wireless leadless cardiac pacemaker; WBAN; security and
privacy; physical-layer security; phantom experiments; channel modeling
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1. Introduction
Rapid development in personal health systems due to wireless body area networks (WBAN)
has resulted in a number of implantable and wearable medical devices. These on-body and in-body
wireless medical devices continuously monitor different physiological conditions and provide proper
diagnosis and treatment. Notable among these devices are cardiac pacemakers and implanted cardiac
defibrillators (ICDs).
Pacemakers are used to treat different types of cardiac arrhythmias. Annually, there are about
0.7 million pacemaker implantations worldwide [1]. A pacemaker senses irregularities between
heartbeats and provides proper actuation via electrodes, thus facilitating the proper functioning
of human heart. Currently these pacemakers are mostly implanted with wired connection between
subcutaneous implants and electrodes in right ventricle and right atrium of the human heart. The next
generation of these pacemakers is expected to be wireless between subcutaneous implants and
electrodes (EU Horizon 2020 Project WiBEC′′ Wireless In-Body Environment) [2]. The only currently
available leadless pacemaker on the market is Medtronic’s Micra [3], which is an autonomous
leadless pacemaker implanted in the right ventricle of a human heart, whereas our project focuses on
multi-nodal leadless pacemakers with subcutaneous implant. Our work focuses on the analysis of the
eavesdropping risk and secrecy rate between a node implanted in the right ventricle and another node
as subcutaneous implanted, but it can be applicable to other scenarios for in-body communications.
These scenarios may include communication between nodes within a heart.
The wireless nature of modern implanted medical devices (IMDs) is a significant source of
security risks. It makes an IMD more visible and can allow an eavesdropper to listen. Thus, an insecure
communication channel makes it easier for an eavesdropper to perform attacks on an implant similar
to attacks on other computing devices. Successful eavesdropping may result in the retrieval of
patient information (medical and non-medical) or performing attacks such as data forging or altering.
In addition, it may enable the modification of the implant configuration without the knowledge of the
patient or physician.
The aim of this work is to estimate the channel models for legitimate and eavesdropper links
by phantom experiments. Estimated channel models are then used to determine the eavesdropping
risk in respective bands along with providing information regarding theoretical secrecy analysis i.e.,
the availability of the secure channel based on secrecy capacity, which can be directly applied, without
any leakage of information to the eavesdropper. We focus on the communication between the leadless
cardiac pacemaker (LCP) and subcutaneous implant in frequencies from 1.7–2.5 GHz (ISM band)
and 3.1–5.1 GHz (UWB). We develop path-loss models for an in-body-to-in-body (IB2IB) scenario
(a legitimate link between the leadless pacemaker in the right ventricle of the human heart and the
subcutaneous implant under the skin below the shoulder) and an in-body-to-off-body (IB2OFF)
scenario (eavesdropper link between the leadless pacemaker and the eavesdropper outside the
body). All results are provided for ultrawide band (UWB) and industrial, scientific, and medical
(ISM) frequency bands, and comparison is provided where applicable. Our key contributions in this
paper are:
• Single and multilayer phantoms for heart muscle, fat, and blood are developed for respective
frequency bands.
• Channel modeling of both legitimate link (IB2IB) and eavesdropper link (IB2OFF).
• Comparison of channel models obtained from measurements performed with different phantoms.
• Probability of successful eavesdropping with respect to eavesdropper distance.
• Secrecy capacity analysis and evaluation of the probability of positive secrecy capacity.
• Design principles or privacy by design where outage probability of a secure rate is determined.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background and problem
description, followed by measurement setup in Section 3. Section 4 provides channel models based
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on measurements. Secrecy analysis including eavesdropping risk and positive secrecy capacity is
provided in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 discusses the results and Section 8 concludes the work.
2. Background & Problem Description
2.1. Background
The work of Halperin et al. [4] is considered to be the pioneer work in security analysis of IMDs,
followed by different research activities providing security for IMD devices [5]. Most of the research is
focused on mitigating the security risks via providing different encryption mechanisms to protect data
between a sender and legitimate nodes [6–8]. In conventional wireless networks, security is considered
to be an independent feature with no or little connection to other tasks of a communication network.
State-of-the-art encryption algorithms are developed for such purposes and are implemented and
studied via cryptographic algorithms (e.g., RSA, AES, DES etc.) [9,10]. These methods rely on the
limited computational power of an eavesdropper and require proper key management servers for
implementation, which cannot be the case for tiny IMDs. In addition, the computational complexity is
also higher because of data encryption with the key.
An alternative could be to offer secure communication via information theoretic measures
or physical-layer security. The concept of information theoretic security was first introduced by
Shannon [11], which was further extended by Wyner [12] with introduction to the wiretap channel.
The idea behind information theoretic security is to limit the leakage of information to an eavesdropper.
A secure communication channel by information theoretic measures can be achieved in two different
ways: one is to secure communication without keys, and can be referred to as keyless security,
whereas the other is to secure communication with keys. Keyless security can be achieved using
appropriate coding schemes with the aid of secrecy capacity [13,14]. Secrecy capacity is the maximum
attainable communication rate without leakage of information to an eavesdropper. The second method
uses random channel characteristics, e.g., received signal strength (RSS), phase or channel state
information (CSI), to generate a key on the physical layer for data encryption. The key-generation
methods rely on channel reciprocity. A good deal of research is devoted to key generation using
channel reciprocity [15–19].
The focal point of information theoretic security or physical-layer security is using the
characteristics of wireless channels. If one can estimate the wireless channels between legitimate
nodes and eavesdropper, then the secure rate for communication can be determined. Thus, to provide
physical-layer security using the keyless security method, the essential part is to predict the legitimate
and eavesdropper channels. The channel characteristics can be achieved by measuring the channel
transfer functions of the legitimate and eavesdropper link. In addition, it can help determine the
channel capacities, respectively. If the eavesdropper channel’s signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is lower
than that of the legitimate channel, then the difference between the link capacities provides the secrecy
capacity for communication. Furthermore, secrecy capacity is the maximum achievable transmission
rate keeping eavesdropper uncertainty about the source message to maximum. To determine the
secrecy capacity of a system, the knowledge about channels between the legitimate link and the
eavesdropper link is required.
Channel characterizations are usually done by software simulations and experimental
measurements that include in vivo and phantom experiments. It is difficult to simulate these channels
in practice using in vivo experiments because of moral, ethical, and physical integrity reasons. Similarly,
software simulations are computationally very costly and requires a good deal of time. A cheap and
better alternative is to characterize human body channels via phantom experiments [20]. Phantoms
are chemical mixtures that can be used to mimic the electromagnetic behavior of different human
body parts provided by Gabriel [21]. From phantom experiments, the amount of data gathered is
of considerable size compared to that of in vivo and software simulations, and can lead to better
estimation of channels.
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In Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) standard IEEE 802.15.6, Medical Implant Communication
System (MICS) frequency band is allocated for implant-to-implant communication that spans
402–405 MHz. Literature is also available on channel modelling in other frequency bands using
phantom experiments for in-body nodes [22–26]. In [27], the off-body-to-in-body mathematical model
based on software simulations is also provided for the propagation of electromagnetic waves through
various tissues/layers by considering reflections from different layers. In our work, we opt for phantom
experiments to measure the channels because of less complexity and ease of use, considering the
random angles of both the receivers (legitimate receiver and eavesdropper). We focus on ISM and
UWB. These frequency bands are under study for implant communications due to prospects such as
high data rate and smaller antenna dimensions.
2.2. Problem Description
The real-world scenario which we want to replicate using phantom experiments is shown in
Figure 1. Our system includes a LCP inside the right ventricle of a human heart that communicates
with a subcutaneous implant whereas an eavesdropper wants to eavesdrop the communication outside
the body. Thus, for security analysis, first we determine the channel models for legitimate and
eavesdropper links using phantom experiments in both ISM and UWB frequency bands. We consider
a transmission of a sounding signal in the respective bands using vector analyzer (VNA), through
different mediums that constitute heart muscle, blood, and fat, emulated as phantoms. Different
antennas are used to replicate a leadless pacemaker in right ventricle, a subcutaneous implant, and an
eavesdropper. Moreover, the antennas used for ISM and UWB frequency bands are also different.
Afterwards these channel models are used to predict the eavesdropping risk and secrecy capacity
analysis. In this paper, the link between a pacemaker and the subcutaneous implant is referred to
as a legitimate link or in-body-to-in-body (IB2IB) link, whereas the link between pacemaker and
eavesdropper is referred as the eavesdropper link or in-body-to-off-body (IB2OFF) link. In addition,
we assume that the eavesdropper is of a passive nature and the legitimate nodes are authenticated by
some authentication protocol.
Figure 1. System Model.
3. Measurement Setup
The setup used for measuring the legitimate and eavesdropper channel is shown in Figure 2.
It contains an anechoic chamber, a Vector Network Analyzer (VNA), a 3D spatial positioner,
a phantom container, and a magnetic tracker. The anechoic chamber is used to reduce the surrounding
environmental contributions, the magnetic tracker measures the distance between transmitter and
receiver antenna at different measuring points, whereas the positioner is used to precisely move
an antenna to different measuring points. The VNA is controlled via a laptop with software that
performs initial calibration of components before measurement and configures all the devices.
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First, it is calibrated with Rosenberger calibration kit RPC-3.50 to remove the losses due to coaxial
cables. Afterwards, it automatically measures the coupling between antennas at the specified grid
points. The phantom temperature is maintained at 24 ◦C because of the variation in permittivity
due to temperature change. The phantoms are developed to emulate at room temperature (24 ◦C),
the electromagnetic properties of the human body at 37 ◦C provided by Gabriel in [21]. More details
about the anechoic chamber and measurement setup can be found in [26]. Table 1, shows the set of
parameters used for ISM and UWB frequency-band measurements. When everything is in place,
before starting automatic measurements across different grid points, the anechoic chamber is closed
from the front to keep it completely concealed from outdoor surroundings.
Figure 2. Measurement Setup.
Table 1. Setup parameters.
Band ISM UWB
Phantom Heart muscle, blood & Fat Heart muscle, blood & Fat
Frequency range 1.7–2.5 GHz 3.1–5.1 GHz
Resolution points 1601 1601
Resolution Frequency 0.5 MHz 1.25 MHz
Intermediate Frequency 3 KHz 3 KHz
Output power 8 dBm 8 dBm
Snapshots per position Ns = 5 Ns = 5
3.1. Phantom Composition and Antenna Description
In phantom-based experiments, a container is filled with liquid phantom that mimics the dielectric
properties of a required human tissue/body organ. Considering our real-world scenario, the phantoms
that depict the dielectric properties of a human heart, fat, and blood are developed. The dielectric
properties of a human body vary in frequency, resulting in different compositions of phantoms for
different frequency bands. First, the phantom formation for the ISM frequency band is presented along
with antennas used. Then, the UWB frequency band will follow.
3.1.1. ISM Band
ISM band is a common band to be employed in medical environments due to being license free.
We develop phantoms with dielectric properties of a human heart, fat, and blood. Figure 3 shows the
dielectric properties of a replicated phantom with its counterpart reported in [21], widely used in
literature. A good approximation of dielectric properties of heart muscle, fat, and blood is observed
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around 2 GHz. A single-layer phantom consists of only heart muscle which is composed of 39.2%
sugar with the remainder water [28]. Multilayer phantom includes heart muscle, blood, and fat. The fat
phantom is composed of 86% of oil in water where 1% of TX-100 was used as surfactant [29]. The blood
phantom is composed of 40% acetonitrile and 1.25% NaCl [30] in water.
For ISM band measurements, we used three sets of antennas to perform our measurement
campaign. An in-body antenna (transmitter) that replicates the leadless pacemaker transmission,
a subcutaneous antenna (legitimate receiver) that is used as a subcutaneous implant, and an external
antenna (eve antenna) that replicates an eavesdropper link. Figure 4 shows reflection coefficients of
the antennas. The reflection coefficients show good matching among all the antennas around 2 GHz.
The antennas used are directional and provided in Figure 5. More details on antennas can be found
in [31].
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Figure 3. Dielectric Properties of ISM Phantom.
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Figure 5. ISM band antennas (a) Transmitter (b) Eve antenna (c) legitimate Receiver.
3.1.2. UWB Frequency Band
We develop phantoms that mimic the dielectric properties of human heart muscle, blood, and fat
in the UWB frequency band. Figure 6, shows the dielectric properties of the replicated phantoms.
For the UWB band, the heart phantom is composed of 54.2% acetonitrile and 1.07% salt in water [32].
Similarly, fat and blood phantom is altered to fit for UWB frequency band.
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Three sets of UWB antennas are used, similar to the ISM band, one implanted (Transmitter),
one subcutaneous (legitimate receiver) and one external antenna (eve antenna). Figure 7 shows the
antennas used. Figure 7b is the transmitter antenna and a similar antenna is used as the legitimate
receiver. The transmitter and legitimate receiver have dimensions of 2.3 × 2 cm2 whereas the eve
antenna dimensions are 5 × 4.4 cm2. All the antennas have a quasi-omnidirectional radiation pattern.
More details on the antennas are provided in [33,34]. Figure 8 shows the S-parameters of the antennas.
All the antennas have transmission parameters of less than −10 dB, which is considered to be a very
efficient transmission parameter.
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Figure 7. UWB antennas (a) Eve Antenna (b) Transmitter and Legitimate receiver.
3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
Frequency Hz 109
-45
-40
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
R
ef
le
ct
io
n 
co
ffi
ci
en
ts
 d
B
Transmitter
Legitmate Receiver
Eve Antenna
Figure 8. S-parameters of UWB antennas.
4. Measured Channel Models
In this section, using the measurement setup, the IB2IB and IB2OFF channel models are
determined for the ISM and UWB frequency bands.
As mentioned earlier, the phantoms prepared are different for different frequency bands.
Therefore, while conducting the experiments for ISM and UWB frequency band, phantoms and
antennas are replaced. First, we used a single-layer phantom that contains only heart muscle for
ISM and perform the IB2IB and IB2OFF measurements. Then we added the fat layer and repeated
the measurements. Once the results are analyzed, a small difference in results with and without
fat is observed. Considering this fact, for UWB frequency band instead of using only heart muscle,
we performed experiments directly with heart muscle and fat layer for IB2IB and IB2OFF measurements
and afterwards the blood layer is added (We wanted to use blood for ISM experiments as well, but the
antenna was broken while performing that experiment due to which the path loss containing blood
phantom for ISM band is not presented).
The measurements for legitimate link (IB2IB) are performed by implanting a transmitter antenna
inside the liquid phantom, whereas the subcutaneous antenna or legitimate receiver is mounted on the
wall of the container (subcutaneous). In the case of the fat layer, the subcutaneous antenna is placed
inside the fat layer as shown in Figure 9. Furthermore, for legitimate link measurements, the implanted
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antenna (transmitter) is moved in different grid points along the x, y and z axis with a step size of
∆x,∆y & ∆z with total grid points of (Nx, Ny, Nz) as shown in Figure 10. For eavesdropper link
measurement, the implanted antenna (transmitter) is fixed at a certain implant depth and eve antenna
is moved across different grid points outside the phantom container to replicate different eavesdropper
positions. In addition, for each measuring point, five snapshots are taken and then averaged to enhance
the SNR. We would like to highlight the fact that the entire experiment takes around three weeks.
Figure 9. Multilayer phantom container inside anechoic chamber.
Figure 10. Measurement Grid points.
4.1. Path-Loss Models
From the measurements, we obtain the channel transfer functions, which help in determining
the path loss for single-layer (heart muscle) and multilayer phantoms (fat + heart + blood) in both
frequency bands. We measured the forward transmission coefficient S21 for N resolution points (see
Table 1); the path loss per spatial position can be expressed as,
PLi(dB) = |hi|2 = 10× log10
(
∑
k=N
|H( f j)k|2
N
)
,
ie(r, e)
je(ISM,UWB)
(1)
Sensors 2018, 18, 4327 10 of 24
H( f j) = |S21|e−j 6 S21 , where |S21| and 6 S21 are module and phase of transmission coefficient.
“i” represents legitimate link (r) and eavesdropper link (e). Similarly, “j” represents the frequency band
(j = ISM or UWB).
4.1.1. ISM Band
4.1.1.1. IB2IB or Legitimate Link
For the legitimate link, the receiver antenna is mounted on the inner surface of the container’s
wall for a single-layer phantom that contains only heart muscle, and the transmitting antenna is
moved in different grid points inside the phantom (Figure 10). A leadless pacemaker is considered
to be an implanted antenna whereas an antenna fixed on the wall of a container is considered to
be a subcutaneous implant. The measured frequency band is 1.7 GHz to 2.5 GHz for the ISM band,
but we only take the narrowband part in which the transmitter’s S11 is below −6 dB. Thus, only those
measurements of S21, for which the S11 reflection coefficient is below −6 dB, are taken into account.
The resulting measured frequency band is 1.946–2.072 GHz as can be seen in Figure 4. The obtained
path loss can be modeled as a distance-dependent logarithmic function and can be expressed as
PLdB = PLd0 + 10× n× log10(
d
d0
) +N (µ, σ) (2)
where, d0 = 4 cm, PLd0 = 22.9284 dB, n = 4.12 and N (µ, σ) = (−3.42× 10−15, 7.3002) ≈ (0, 7.3002).
This model is valid for legitimate link distances from 2.7–12 cm. The observed randomness is because
of measurements at different angles from the transmitting antenna. For a 2-layer phantom, we fill the
portion of the container with a fat layer (Figure 9 except blood layer) and mounted the subcutaneous
antenna in the fat layer. We determined the path-loss model, similar to (2). The parameters are
d0 = 4 cm, PLd0 = 21.85 dB, n = 4.12 andN (µ, σ) = (−4.6× 10−16, 4.5) ≈ (0, 4.5). Figure 11 shows the
path-loss models both for single-layer and multilayer phantoms together, in which dots are path-loss
measurements and the lines are the fitted model. It can be seen that because of the low value of fat
dielectric constant, it does not greatly change the path loss model.
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Figure 11. Path-loss legitimate link (IB2IB, ISM).
4.1.1.2. IB2OFF or Eavesdropper Link
As we noticed a slight difference in path-loss model with and without fat layer for IB2OFF
measurements, we used the single-layer phantom (heart muscle). To find the path loss for the off-body
link, we fixed the implanted antenna inside the heart phantom at an implant depth of 11.5 cm and
moved the external antenna along the grid points as shown in Figure 10. This replicates the scenario
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where the leadless pacemaker is implanted at a depth of 11.5 cm inside the body, transmitting to a
subcutaneous implant and an eavesdropper outside the body trying to eavesdrop the communication.
Similarly to IB2IB, we take S21 measurements for narrowband where matching occurs. The path-loss
model obtained can be expressed in terms of distance-dependent logarithmic function (2) and the
parameters are d0 = 17.45 cm, PLd0 = 46.97 dB, n = 3.352 and N (µ, σ) = (−1.17× 10−15, 4.40235) ≈
(0, 4.40235). Figure 12 shows the path-loss model for mentioned implant depth. This path-loss model
is valid for a distance range of 17.5–40 cm. After 40 cm, a free-space path-loss model can be applied.
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Figure 12. Path-loss eavesdropper link (IB2OFF, ISM).
4.1.2. UWB Band
4.1.2.1. IB2IB or Legitimate Link
For the UWB frequency band, first, an experiment with a heart muscle and fat layer is performed
which is then followed by the blood phantom. To find the IB2IB path-loss model, we fixed an in-body
antenna (subcutaneous) in the fat layer and move another in-body antenna to different grid points.
Figure 9 shows the placement scenario inside an anechoic chamber. The path-loss model parameters
for the IB2IB scenario containing all three phantom layers (heart muscle, blood, and fat) are d0 = 4 cm,
PLd0 = 59.54 dB, n = 3.7284 and N (µ, σ) = (−1.445× 10−14, 1.9675) ≈ (0, 1.9675). This path-loss
model is valid for distances of 1 cm–10 cm. Similarly the parameters for 2-layer phantom (heart muscle
and fat), d0 = 4 cm, PLd0 = 54.1830 dB, n = 3.37 andN (µ, σ) = (−2.8442× 10−16, 1.5301) ≈ (0, 1.5301).
Figure 13 shows the path-loss model with and without blood. A difference of about 5 dB is observed
in experiments with and without blood.
4.1.2.2. IB2OFF or Eavesdropper Link
For IB2OFF, we measured the channel only by considering fat and heart muscle. This is because
from an eavesdropping perspective the path loss without blood will be the best-case scenario and
worst-case scenario for the leadless capsule. However, if we want to have path loss with blood, at each
measuring point 5 dB of loss must be added.
We fixed an in-body antenna at an implant depth of 7 cm and then moved the off-body antenna
to different points. Figure 14 shows the path-loss model of the off-body scenario. The parameters
in terms of log distance model are d0 = 10 cm, PLd0 = 72.24 dB, n = 2.67 and N (µ, σ) = (−1.1627×
10−15, 1.6328) ≈ (0, 1.6328). In the case of UWB, the IB2OFF path-loss model is valid for 10–27 cm,
whereas beyond 27 cm the free-space path-loss model can be applied.
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Table 2 provides summary and comparison of path-loss models for ISM and UWB frequency band.
Table 2. Summary of path-loss models.
ISM Band UWB Band
Parameters
Legitimate
Link
(IB2IB)
Legitimate
Link
(IB2IB)
Eve Link
(IB2OFF)
Legitimate
Link
(IB2IB)
Legitimate
Link
(IB2IB)
Eve Link
(IB2OFF)
Layers 1 2 1 3 2 2
PLd0 (dB) 22.92 21.85 46.97 59.54 54.138 72.24
n 4.12 4.12 3.352 3.7284 3.37 2.67
σ 7.3002 4.5 4.4023 1.9675 1.5301 1.6328
µ 0 0 0 0 0 0
d0 (cm) 4 4 17.45 4 4 10
Distance Range (cm) 2.7–12 2.7–12 17.5–40 1–10 1–10 10–27
5. Estimating Eavesdropping Risk (Risk Analysis)
This section focuses on estimating eavesdropping risk for next-generation leadless pacemakers
in the case of using ISM and UWB band for RF communication. As mentioned earlier, our system
consists of an eavesdropper, an IMD and a subcutaneous node as shown in Figure 1. We consider
implanted leadless capsules inside the right ventricle of a human heart. This leadless capsule transmits
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un-encrypted data to the subcutaneous implant, where the eavesdropper tries to eavesdrop the
communication. In case of IMDs, Eve can be categorized as
• An eavesdropper, where eavesdropping legitimate transmission can be an active or passive node.
• A possibility of single eavesdropper, or part of a well-organized group.
• An external intruder, but there can be the case where an eavesdropper is from inside the system
e.g., physician, hospital administration, equipment manufacturers etc., because they have the
benefit of being close to patient.
It can be seen that each eavesdropper may have different intentions or goals. There may
be the possibility that one eavesdrops just to get the private information of a patient or there
may be a case where there is competition between manufacturers to obtain information on IMD
equipment. An eavesdropper may have higher capabilities than that of legitimate nodes such as
higher computational power, higher antenna gains, etc. In this work, we consider a single passive
eavesdropper with the same capabilities as the legitimate node trying to eavesdrop the communication.
We also consider a case where the eavesdropper has higher antenna gain.
5.1. Eavesdropper Model
In this section, the probability of successful eavesdropping (Pse) is provided by considering the
path-loss models depicted during our measurement campaign, both for UWB and the ISM frequency
band. To find Pse, we use an approach of channel capacity as a measure. Using channel capacity
as a basis, for a given information rate (R), there exists a minimum received power to successfully
decode the transmission based on a certain threshold SNR. Using this concept, the channel’s capacity
is expressed by Shannon capacity formula as
C = B× log2(1+ γth) (3)
where B is channel bandwidth, C is capacity and γth is the threshold SNR. To determine the threshold
SNR required to support the information rate (R), (3) can be expressed as
γth(R) > 2
R
B − 1 (4)
Thus, when SNR at the input of a receiver chain falls below certain threshold level [35],
the communication can be termed as in outage and can be expressed as
Pout(γth) = P [γ < γth] (5)
where γ is received SNR. Thus, we can say that when the link is an outage then the eavesdropper will
not be able to eavesdrop the communication. Thus, an outage probability can be complemented in
terms of probability of successful eavesdropping.
5.2. Probability of Successful Eavesdropping (Pse)
To find the probability of successful eavesdropping, received SNR is required, which can be
achieved at a particular distance using the IB2OFF channel model, both for UWB and ISM frequency
band Sections 4.1.1.2 and 4.1.2.2. The received SNR can be expressed as,
γdB = PtdBm − PL(d)dB − NoBdBm (6)
where, NoB is the noise power, Pt is transmit power and PL(d) is the IB2OFF path loss at distance
(d) (Eve distance). For a communication between legitimate nodes, the value of SNR (γ) should be
greater than threshold, otherwise the communication link will be in outage. However, we want an
eavesdropper link to be in outage. Using the concept of outage probability (5), we must take certain
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cutoff thresholds represented by γth. The eavesdropper can eavesdrop communication with certain
probability, when the SNR (γ) between the leadless capsule and eavesdropper is greater than the set
cutoff threshold γth. i.e., γ > γth. The probability of successful eavesdropping can be expressed as,
Pse = 1− pout(γth) (7)
As SNR (γ) is log normally distributed (Table 2) with mean µγ and standard deviation σγ, we can
express (7) by Q-function as
Pse = 1−
(
1−Q
(
γthdB − µγdB
σγdB
))
(8)
Pse = Q
(
γth − µγ
σγ
)
,
Pse = 1− ϕ
(
γth − µγ
σγ
)
,
Pse = 1− 12
(
1+ er f
(
γth − µγ
σγ
√
2
)) (9)
The eavesdropper can increase the probability of successful eavesdropping by using high-gain
antennas. An antenna with high gain has a reception from greater distances and has higher
SNR. However, nothing comes without cost, and higher gain results from larger dimensions of
antennas. Different antennas have different antenna gain and aperture relation but in general it can be
expressed as
Ae =
λ2Ge
4pi
(10)
From the eavesdropper perspective, Eve wants to eavesdrop without noticing. However,
with large aperture antennas it cannot happen easily. Therefore, the gain of an antenna cannot
be increased above certain limits e.g., if we want to have an antenna gain of 20 dBi then the effective
aperture of an antenna will be around 18 cm2 (for frequency of 2 GHz) which cannot go unnoticed
within the short distance of a patient.
5.2.1. Pse for ISM and UWB Frequency Band
To find the eavesdropping risk, path loss at different eavesdropper distances is determined
using (1) and the model parameters provided in Table 2 for an eavesdropper link. This helps
determining the received SNR for fixed transmitted power. In addition, we also measured the
receiver sensitivity for a bandwidth of 1 MHz, which is found to be −90 dBm. Furthermore, different
information rates (R) are considered for communication between legitimate nodes, and determine
corresponding cutoff thresholds by using (4). We assume the information rates that reflect the
real-life application rates such as EMG, ECG, and pulse rate, that are listed in Table 3 [36]. Finally,
using (9), we determine the probability of successful eavesdropping risk for a cardiac leadless
pacemaker communicating to a subcutaneous implant. Figure 15 shows the probability of successful
eavesdropping with varying eavesdropper distance for the ISM frequency band. We consider a
channel bandwidth of 1 MHz. The probability of a successful eavesdropping for an information rate
of 600 kbps (EMG) is about 97.68% at an eavesdropper distance of 1.3 m and approaches approx
28.13% at an eavesdropper distance of 4.2 m. Similarly, the eavesdropping risk for heart pulse is about
100% at 1.3 m and 4.2 m, whereas for ECG signal the risk is 99.68% at 1.3 m and 65.93% at 4.2 m.
When the information rate goes up, the requirement for threshold SNR increases, resulting in lower
eavesdropping probability. Similarly, the effect of an eavesdropper antenna is also considered which
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shows that increase in eavesdropping risk occurs when the eavesdropper uses a high-gain antenna as
shown in Figure 15, one without antenna gain and one with antenna gain of 4 dBi for information rate
of medical image and electromyogram (EMG).
Table 3. IMD data traffic.
Sensing Parameter Required Data Rate
Heart rate 1 sample/s or 600 bps
Medical image 1 Mbps
Blood pressure 1.2 kbps
EMG 600 kbps
EEG 4.2–32 kbps
ECG 250 kbps
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
distance (m)
10-2
10-1
100
R(Pulse)=600bps
R(ECG)=250kbps
R(EMG)=600kbps (G
e
=0dBi)
R(Medical image)=1Mbps (G
e
=0dBi)
R(EMG)=600kbps (G
e
=4dBi)
R(Medical image)=1Mbps (G
e
=4dBi)
Figure 15. Probability of Successful eavesdropping w.r.t Eve Distance (ISM Band).
Furthermore, for the UWB frequency band, Figure 16 shows the probability of successful
eavesdropping. Here it would be good to notify that we consider the path-loss model without
blood because it would be the best-case scenario for an eavesdropper. Due to high losses in UWB,
the eavesdropping risk is considerably less than the ISM band which is one of the advantages of
using UWB for in-body networks along with high data rate capabilities. Figure 16 shows the Pse
on a per-MHz basis similar to ISM frequency band. Similarly, for an information rate of an EMG,
the eavesdropping risk drops to 0.2847% at an eavesdropping distance of 0.22 m in the case of the
UWB frequency band.
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0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
distance (m)
10-15
10-10
10-5
100
R=600bps
R=250kbps
R=600kbps (Ge= 0dBi)
R=1Mbps (Ge= 0dBi)
R=600kbps (Ge= 4dBi)
R=1Mbps (Ge= 4dBi)
Figure 16. Probability of successful eavesdropping w.r.t Eve distance (UWB).
6. Secrecy Capacity Analysis
From risk analysis, it is evident to have some secure mechanisms to keep the pacemaker safe from
an eavesdropper. As mentioned earlier, this section focuses on the potential of securing pacemakers
using a physical-layer security method. Our intention is to use the keyless security method by using
the concept of secrecy capacity and secure channel. We deal with exploring the availability of secrecy
capacity by using the channel models obtained in Section 4.
Secrecy capacity is the maximum attainable communication rate between legitimate nodes without
any leakage of information to the eavesdropper. Consider the wireless system depicted in Figure 1,
where a leadless pacemaker communicates with a subcutaneous implant and the eavesdropper
attempts to eavesdrop the communication, by recalling [37] for an additive Gaussian wiretap channel,
where both channels are corrupted by Gaussian noise in a way that the eavesdropper channel is noisier
than legitimate channel i.e., We >Wr. Then, the instantaneous secrecy capacity is given as,
Cs = Cr − Ce (11)
where,
Cr =
1
2
log2(1+ γr) (12)
is the instantaneous channel capacity of legitimate link and
Ce =
1
2
log2(1+ γe) (13)
is the instantaneous channel capacity of eavesdropper link, which follows instantaneous secrecy
capacity as,
Cs =

[
1
2 log2(1+ γr)− 12 log2(1+ γe)
]+
, if γr > γe.
0, otherwise.
(14)
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γr is legitimate channel (IB2IB) SNR and γe is eavesdropper channel (IB2OFF) SNR. Cs is positive when
γr > γe, which means that the legitimate nodes can communicate securely at that positive secrecy rate.
Furthermore, SNR of each link can be expressed as
γi =
Pt × |hi|2
Wi
, ie(r, e) (15)
where, Pt is transmitted power, |hr|2, |he|2 are channel gains of respective links and W is noise power.
As we observed, the channel gains follow log-normal distribution. Thus, γr and γe will also follow
the log-normal distribution at any measuring point with mean and standard deviation (µr,σr) and
(µe,σe), respectively. The fundamental parameters in the context of secrecy capacity are probability of
positive secrecy capacity (Ppcs ) and outage probability of secrecy capacity (OPcs ). When the legitimate
link SNR is better than the eavesdropper link, the secrecy capacity is positive and can be referred to
as positive secrecy capacity. The outage probability of secrecy capacity is the probability of outage
for certain fixed secrecy rate (Rs) with respect to eavesdropper distance. As γr and γe are mutually
independent and log normally distributed, then for single realization of a legitimate channel and
eavesdropper channel, the probability of positive secrecy capacity can be expressed as,
P(Cs > 0) = P(γr > γe) (16)
To find OPcs and Ppcs together, if we consider a certain fixed secrecy rate (Rs) then the outage
probability can be expressed as
P(Cs < Rs) = 1−P(Cs > Rs) (17)
Thus, by using definitions of probability,
P(Cs > Rs) = P
(
log2
(
1+ γr
1+ γe
)
> Rs
)
= P(γr > eRs ln 2(1+ γe)− 1)
=
∫ ∞
0
fγe(γe)
(∫ ∞
eRs ln 2(1+γe)−1
fγr (γr)dγr
)
dγe
=
∫ ∞
0
fγe(γe)
(
1− Fγr (eRs ln 2(1+ γe)− 1)
)
dγe
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
fγe(γe)Fγr (e
Rs ln 2(1+ γe)− 1)dγe
= eRs ln 2
∫ ∞
0
Fγe(γe) fγr (e
Rs ln 2(1+ γe)− 1)dγe
(18)
where,
Fγr (γr) = 1−Q
(
lnγr − ln µγr
4a
)
(19)
Fγe(γe) = 1−Q
(
lnγe − ln µγe
4b
)
(20)
Fγr (γr) and Fγe(γe) are cumulative distribution functions of γr and γe. In addition, where, ln E(γe)
is the mean SNR of eavesdropper link and ln E(γr) is mean SNR for legitimate link (see Equation(15))
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and a = σr ln 1040 and b =
σe ln 10
40 , where σe is the channel deviation of eavesdropper link and σr is of
legitimate link provided in Table 2. Substituting in (18)
P(Cs > Rs) = e
Rs ln 2
4a
√
2pi
∫ ∞
0
1
eRs ln 2(1+ γe)− 1) ×
(
1−Q
(
1
4b
ln
γe
µγe
))
×
exp
1
2
(
1
4a
ln
(
eRs ln 2(1+ γe)− 1
µγr
))2 dγe (21)
Equation (21) can be evaluated by numerical methods. The preposition obtained is
P(Cs < Rs) = Q
(
ln µγrµγe + 8(b
2 − a2)− Rs ln 2
4
√
a2 + b2
)
(22)
The proof of (22) is provided in [38] and for convenience also in Appendix A. For strictly positive
secrecy capacity Rs is set to 0, Thus, (22) can be expressed as [38]
P(Cs > 0) = 1−Q
(
ln µγe − ln µγr + 8(b2 − a2)
4
√
a2 + b2
)
(23)
Based on legitimate node and eavesdropper location, γrα 1dnr and γeα
1
dne
. Thus, if de >> dr and
γr >> γe, then P(Cs > 0) ≈ 1. In our case scenario, the legitimate nodes are inside the body,
whereas an eavesdropper is outside the body, due to which probability of secrecy capacity is depicted
in near proximity of implanted devices.
6.1. Probability of Positive Secrecy Capacity (Ppcs )
The probability of positive secrecy capacity for ISM and UWB frequency band is depicted in this
section. By using (23), the probability of positive secrecy capacity for different legitimate distance
against eavesdropper distance is plotted in Figure 17 for ISM and UWB frequency band. Two fixed
distances for legitimate links are considered and for each distance, the probability of positive secrecy
capacity is plotted against varying eavesdropping distance. Figure 17, shows that as the eavesdropping
distance increases, probability of positive secrecy capacity approaches to one P(Cs > 0) ≈ 1. It also
shows that if the eavesdropper is exactly at the same distance to that of the legitimate node i.e., 120 mm,
there is still about 44.88% probability of positive secrecy capacity and it approaches approximately 97%
at eavesdropping distance of 400 mm for an ISM frequency band whereas for UWB frequency band at
the same legitimate distance i.e., 120 mm, Ppcs is about 96.84% and similarly approaches to 100% at
eavesdropping distance of 400 mm. Thus, UWB frequency band has a higher probability of positive
secrecy capacity at the same distance in comparison to the ISM frequency band. This is because of
higher attenuation values in the UWB frequency band, which turns out to be a friend and not a foe,
for secrecy purposes.
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0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
Eveasdropper distance (m)
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Legitmate link distance = 100mm
Legitmate link distance = 120mm
ISM
UWB
Figure 17. Ppcs regarding legitimate link SNR.
6.2. Outage Probability of Secrecy Capacity (OPcs)
Similarly, if we consider certain fixed secrecy rate for our application, then we can determine
the outage probability for the given secrecy rate. It is observed that by setting a secrecy rate
(Rs) = 2 bps/Hz and legitimate distance of 120 mm, outage probability is about 80.81% at an
eavesdropping distance of 120 mm, whereas at eavesdropping distance of 400 mm it falls to 11.12% for
ISM frequency band as shown in Figure 18. For UWB frequency band, considering the same statistics,
outage probability at an eavesdropping distance of 120 mm is about 78%, whereas for eavesdropping
distance of 400 mm it falls to about 0.5× 10−6%, which shows the rapid decay in outage probability of
secrecy rate.
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
Eveasdropper distance (m)
10-8
10-6
10-4
10-2
100
Legitmate link distance = 100mm
Legitmate link distance = 120mm
ISM
UWB
Figure 18. Outage probability of secrecy rate.
7. Discussions
In this section, we discuss the results and compare them for ISM and UWB frequency bands
provided as contributions in Section 1. Our findings show that both IB2IB link and IB2OFF link in either
case (ISM and UWB) follow the log-normal distribution, which can perfectly represent the real scenario
of propagation through different body tissues, e.g., heart muscle, blood, and fat. It is evident that path
loss in case of UWB frequency band is higher compared to the ISM band due to which the outage
probability of link is also high, resulting in lower cases for eavesdropping. The probability of successful
eavesdropping for an information rate of 600 kbps (EMG) is about 97% at an eavesdropping distance
of 1.2 m and approaches to approximately 28% at an eavesdropping distance of 4.2 m. For similar
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rate, the eavesdropping risk drops to 0.2847% at an eavesdropping distance of 0.22 m in case of UWB
frequency band.
Similarly, for secrecy capacity analysis where both the links (IB2IB and IB2OFF) play roles, then in
the case of UWB the probability of positive secrecy capacity is about 100% at an eavesdropping distance
of 200 mm, considering the distance between legitimate nodes to be 120 mm, whereas for a similar
scenario, considering ISM band the probability of positive secrecy capacity is about 76%. In addition,
if we consider a certain fix secrecy rate Rs = 2 bps/Hz, then for UWB band the outage probability is
about 3.4%, whereas for ISM band is about 48.53%, considering the distance between legitimate nodes
to be 120 mm.
In fact, UWB has many advantages, including high bandwidth, high data rate, and continuous
hopping to make it resilient to interference. In addition, UWB is also considered to be more secure.
To eavesdrop in case of UWB is like tracking a person who changes clothes continuously while running
at very high speeds. Considering our application of a cardiac leadless pacemaker, very little bandwidth
and data rate is required, due to which transmission in an ISM band is more feasible. Furthermore,
it is analyzed that the positive secrecy capacity still can be achieved, even when the eavesdropper is as
close as 12 to 15 cm from an implanted node. It is been found that even if the eavesdropper is exactly
the same distance as an implanted node to which the leadless capsule is transmitting, the probability
of positive secrecy capacity is still about 45% and approaches approximately 97% at eavesdropping
distance of 40 cm for the ISM band, whereas for UWB the stats are 96% and 100% at 40 cm. With the
advent of positive secrecy capacity, Gaussian wiretap codes or LDPC codes can be used to achieve this
secrecy rate.
The channel is considered to be secure if the transmissions are done on a secrecy rate. This physical-
layer security (PLS) method can also be used along with conventional encryption algorithms on higher
layers. If the secure channel rate is low, only encryption keys from higher layers can be shared over
available low-rate secure channels, whereas encrypted data communications follows afterwards.
8. Conclusions
This work analyzes the eavesdropping risk and the potential of securing next-generation LCPs
communicating between implanted nodes via PLS methods. The objective is achieved by adopting
the methodology of phantom experiments. In conventional pacemakers, the electrodes in the right
atrium and right ventricle are connected via wires to the subcutaneous implant, whereas in the case of
a leadless pacemaker the electrodes will transmit wirelessly to the subcutaneous implant, due to which
the security is of great concern from an eavesdropper perspective. A three-node model is considered
where two nodes are implanted inside the body and an external node located outside the body acts as
an eavesdropper.
Human heart-, fat-, and blood-like homogeneous and heterogeneous liquid phantoms are
developed to mimic the behavior of electromagnetic wave propagation through the heart. Phantoms
developed closely reflect the dielectric properties of heart, fat, and blood in the respective bands.
Using these phantoms along with an automated channel measurement mechanism, the channel
transfer functions are obtained for a legitimate link and link between implanted node and that of an
eavesdropper. Channel measurements are performed for ISM and UWB frequency bands. Furthermore,
these channel transfer functions are used to develop path-loss models for both IB2IB link (legitimate
link) and IB2OFF link (eavesdropper link) in both bands. Once the path-loss models are depicted,
the probability of successful eavesdropping is determined by using the concept of outage probability
for different cardiac usable information rates. Afterwards, secrecy capacity analysis is applied to
highlight the potential of PLS security methods for wireless cardiac implants.
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Appendix A
P(Cs > 0) = 1
4a
√
2pi
∫ ∞
0
1
γe
×
(
1−Q
(
1
4b
ln
γe
n
))
× exp
(
1
2
(
1
4a
ln
(γe
m
))2)
dγe
(A1)
Consider,
x =
1
4b
√
2
ln
(γe
n
)
(A2)
Then (A1) becomes
P(Cs > 0) = ba√pi (α− β) (A3)
where,
α =
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
−
(
b
a
)2 (
x+
1
4b
√
2
ln
( n
m
))2)
dx
=
a
√
pi
b
(A4)
β =
∫ ∞
−∞
Q(x
√
2)exp
(
−
(
b
a
)2 (
x+
1
4b
√
2
ln
( n
m
))2)
dx (A5)
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Using Middleton’s work ([39], p. 1072), β can be expressed as
β =
a
√
pi
b
Q
(
ln(n/m)
4
√
a2 + b2
)
(A6)
which follows,
P(Cs < Rs) = Q
(
ln µγrµγe + 8(b
2 − a2)− Rs ln 2
4
√
a2 + b2
)
(A7)
and
P(Cs > 0) = Q
(
ln µγe − ln µγr + 8(b2 − a2)
4
√
a2 + b2
)
(A8)
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